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Abstract
The main aim of the paper is the analysis and critique of axiological relativism, typical of 
contemporary Western culture. Its supporters deny the objective status of moral norms and 
values. Axiological relativism leads to moral indifference based on blurring the difference 
between good and evil, and negating the belief that human action may be morally better or 
worse. I present the anti ‑relativistic position of St. John Paul II, particularly in relation to 
the truth, understood as a cognitive and moral value. According to the Pope, a civilization 
based on the belief of the relative nature of good and evil leads to widespread hypocrisy 
and is destined to a slow decline.
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1. The axiological relativism and its negative consequences
Currently, a very ‚fashionable‘ way of ordering the world is relativism, especially 
in its axiological version. Axiological relativism is developing relationships based 
on the relativity of truth, and above all, the truth about the good. There are many 
varieties of relativism: cognitive, linguistic, cultural, or axiological. In general, 
any doctrine which holds that existence of something (a value, the status quo) 
depends on something else, something which exists only in relation to something 
else, can be considered as relativist. Thus, there is no absolute truth, one which 
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is independent of man, place and time. The values are determined and defined 
by culture, society, or the individual1.
In its extreme form, cognitive relativism claims that all beliefs: individual 
and collective are real (i.e. cognitively equivalent). In addition, if a judgment is 
true, it is only true ‚for someone‘ or ‚due to someone‘. There are no sentences, 
which would be true regardless of certain criteria2.
Language relativism assumes, on the other hand, that our understanding 
and description of the world are determined by the structure of our language. 
Therefore, it is the diversity of languages that forms different patterns of thinking, 
exploring the world and evaluating people‘s attitudes. The relativistic theory of 
language serves cultural relativists as the basis for their argumentation. They 
ascribe different cultures the status of certain realities sui generis, with a unique 
and incomparable structure. Thus, all cultures are equal, and promoting one of 
them is discrimination – both racial and ethnic. Axiological equality of cultures 
means that every ethos, style and pattern of life propagated by a given culture 
is equivalent to the other3.
Let us discuss the main subject of our consideration  – the axiological 
relativism. Its supporters claim that there are no objective standards of norms 
and values. Let us recall that the word ‚relativism‘ is derived from the Latin 
word ‚relativus‘, which indicates relations, and the relativity of truth about the 
good. What is morally good for one person, is not necessarily so – for the other. 
What is morally wrong for one person, can be morally neutral for others. Thus, 
in their ontological status, good and evil are dependent on human notions, as 
well as historical and cultural conditions4. It follows that all moral judgements 
are equally valid. It should also be added that axiological relativism is not 
only about the very variety of views on values and norms. The theory would 
then be acceptable as a meta ‑system concept, as part of a broadly understood 
research concept. The problem with axiological relativism is that it functions 
not only on the meta level, but also as an ethical system, proclaiming the 
 1 D. Probucka, The Axiological Relativism and the Message of Pope John Paul II, in: 
D. P. Klimczak, A. Sojka (eds), Literature – Man – Value, Kraków 2007, Instytut Wydawniczy 
„Maximum”, p. 229–231.
 2 Z. Zdunowski, Teaching Philosophy and its Troubles with Truth, “Analiza i Egzystencja” 
25 (2014), p. 216–218.
 3 J. Majcherek, The Cultural Relativism, Kraków 1995, WSP, p. 154.
 4 I. Lazari ‑Pawłowska, Ethics, Wrocław 1992, Ossolineum, p. 110.
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thesis of the ontological status of values  and norms. Thus, not only views on 
values  change over time and are dependent on place and culture, but the very 
existence of values  such as truth and goodness is not autonomous either. It 
depends on a specific person and the entire community. A symptom of the 
crisis of the modern world was recognizing axiological relativism as a model 
on the level of an ethical system, while rejecting the danger of the fact that 
this situation leads to axiological indifferentism, i.e. blurring the difference 
between good and evil, and negating the belief that human actions may be 
morally better or worse.
Let us consider one more issue. Some philosophers believe that axiological 
relativism is the inevitable consequence of cultural relativism, which is an 
empirical fact. In their view, the widespread observability of the latter not 
only strengthens axiological relativism, but provides a credible reason for its 
recognition as well. This is one of the tragic errors of modern philosophy. 
German philosopher Max Scheler talked about this as early as the beginning of 
the twentieth century. According to him, cultural relativism does not necessarily 
need to result in axiological relativism, since there is no logically necessary 
connection between these two theories. The multitude of different cultures and 
related life ethoses does not result in neither axiological equivalence of these 
cultures, nor in a postulate to equally accept them. If we accepted this demand 
as correct, then any behaviour would be allowed. We could then justify racism, 
nazism, genocide, bestiality, or slavery. The adoption of axiological relativism 
as a logical consequence of cultural relativism means that all human behaviour 
is morally equivalent.
Let us go back to the main thread of our considerations associated with the 
negative consequences of axiological relativisation. Recognition of relativistic 
thinking as a model leads to the rejection of the hierarchy of the components of 
human nature, and thus to its degradation. This is because this kind of thinking 
eliminates the philosophical problem of what is inferior in human nature, and 
what is on an axiologically higher level. This means de facto abandonment of the 
process of educational and cultural refining of man5. Thus, the adoption of 
a relativistic perspective must lead to the belief that all components of human 
nature are equivalent. Thus, they can be seen as equally important or equally 
invalid.
 5 A. Kulig ‑Jęsiek, Ethics – Philosophy – Education in the Light of the Words of John Paul II, 
“Zeszyty Filozoficzne” (2009) nr 14–15, p. 75–89.
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So what impact would axiological relativism have on the education of the 
representatives of the species Homo sapiens? At the heart of education lies 
the assumption that man can advance towards a certain axiological goal, the 
ideal, which is humanity. After all, education is a continuation of the ancient 
paideia, based not on who the man is, but who should he become6. How then 
to shape, to educate a man without ideas of humanity? Relativism takes it in 
parenthesis, and treats the very requirement for development of the human 
being as an unauthorised interference with people‘s right of self ‑determination. 
Also, how can a person determine oneself, without knowing that there are 
higher values, to which one should aspire. Can we search for something when 
we are not even aware of its existence? How can a man strive for goodness 
and truth, if he has been raised in the spirit of relativism and has not received 
the knowledge that good and truth are the most important determinants of 
humanity? After all, according to relativists, these values are only hypotheses 
of human mind, components of different narratives, metaphors, and nothing 
else. What is important in relativism is not what the good and truth are, but 
what is the utility of these values, since each era, each community, each person 
has their own truth and their own idea of  good.
Accepting this thinking as a model is one of the sources of the crisis of 
modern schooling, which has lost the deeper meaning of education, reducing it 
exclusively to passing on knowledge. According to the ancient concept of paideia, 
school should shape the student‘s personality, nurture it, and thus ‚unravel‘ values 
for him, and teach their implementation. The current schooling system has long 
since lost this function, experiencing axiological anomie.
All in all, the dominance of relativistic thinking in contemporary culture 
means that an individual belief may be considered to be binding. Man becomes 
the highest authority for himself. He recognizes only his own view as the 
benchmark of fairness, because he no longer has any other, objective standards. 
Thus, centuries of collective experience, wisdom accumulated by generations, 
the tradition, no longer have any meaning7.
 6 Z. Kalita, The Philosophy of Paideia. History and the Present, in: D. Probucka, A. Olech, 
M. Woźniczka (eds), The Passion or Mission? The teaching Philosophy, Częstochowa 2001, WSP, 
p. 86–93.
 7 A. Guggenheim, Pour un nouvel humanism. Essai sur le philosophie de Jean – Paul II, 
Paris 2011, p. 203.
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Thus understood, relativism leads to permissivism and accepting the 
view that anything is allowed. Lack of an objective hierarchy of values, or an 
axiological order causes the decline of the purpose and meaning of life. One‘s 
existence begins to resemble roaming without any direction. This direction 
could have been determined by the ultimate goal, however, it was lost due to 
the lack of standards and lasting values. What is left are only short ‑term, ad hoc, 
temporary goals, characterised by their superficial and episodic character. The 
meaning of life becomes a quest for a constant change. Due to the lack of a lasting 
point of reference, lack of axiological foundations, everything that man makes 
acquires an incidental character, becomes contingent and temporary. Hence, 
according to Zygmunt Bauman, a human attitude typical of a world dominated 
by relativistic thinking can be described using four metaphors: ‚tourist‘, ‚stroller‘, 
‚vagabond‘, and ‚gambler‘8.
Although he has a home, the ‚tourist‘ stays there only temporarily because of 
his constant travels in order to meet other people and cultures, and to experience 
strong emotions. Therefore, temporality is a fundamental feature of his life. On 
the other hand, the ‚stroller‘ comes in no deeper contact with people. During 
episodic meetings, he only engages in small talk with them. His relationships 
with people have no history, and because of their contingency, will have no 
future either. Superficiality and episodic character are the hallmarks of his life. 
On the other hand, the ‚vagabond‘ symbolizes a break with the social order; he 
stands for ‚wild freedom‘, a freedom with no underlying positive values. The 
pursuit of constant change becomes more important than finding the leading 
purpose in life. The last persona, the ‚player‘, symbolises the attitude of a man, 
who is accompanied by risks and uncertainties all his life. In this case, the risk 
means the lack of a solid foundation, unchanging principles and values. The 
surrounding reality is dangerous and the future unpredictable.
At this point, it is difficult to answer the question to what extent axiological 
relativism is the cause, and to what extent the effect of disintegration of the 
traditional hierarchy of values  and the reason for the spiritual shallowness 
of human existence. Let us remember that, from a historical perspective, it 
characterised all periods of decline and was symptomatic of the last stage of 
civilization. The process of disintegration of the traditional hierarchy of values 
would be as follows: Moral relativism (adoption of the thesis of the heteronomic 
 8 Z. Bauman, Two Essays of Postmodern Morality, Warszawa 1994, Instytut Kultury, p. 7–39.
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status of good and evil) – skepticism (ignorance of what is good and bad) – moral 
nihilism (a belief in the non ‑existence of good and evil).
In Greek philosophy and Christian philosophy and theology, good and 
truth were the highest values. These were the basic values upon which the 
entire European ethics system was built. By stressing the relativity of these 
values, relativism has initiated the process of their displacement from axiological 
thinking. The culmination of this process can be considered the philosophy of 
liberalism, in which good and truth have been replaced by the idea of  freedom, 
recognised as the highest value. Thus, the Christian principle of ‚doing good and 
avoiding evil‘ has been replaced by a directive of ‚broadening the scope of one‘s 
own freedom‘. The freedom is understood here as liberation from everything 
that may be perceived as a restriction. The consequence of this is a contemporary 
demand of tolerance for what is happening around us. Its negative side are: 
indifference to injustice, cruelty, deceit, betrayal. This is a  tacit consent to 
lie, involving no judgement and no punishment. This is lack of ideological 
orientation and axiological indifference. After all, a man who appreciates the 
truth refuses contact with a liar. In contrast, a man for whom the truth has ceased 
to be a value, will tolerate a liar, i.e. will show him indulgence, thus forgetting 
that he had rewarded evil.
2. The idea of truth in the ethics of Karol Wojtyła —  
St. John Paul II
The entire philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła – St.  John Paul II 
could be described as the philosophy of a man who wants to serve the truth. 
The first book of Karol Wojtyła entitled Ethics Primer, published in 1958, was 
only the first of a series of work on the same subject. Related topics appear in 
a later, 1969 book – The Acting Person. However, to these issues he has fully 
devoted two encyclicals in his pontificate: Veritatis Splendor and Fides et Ratio. 
According to the Pope, the essence of our humanity is striving towards the 
truth. This is the only thing that can give a deeper meaning to our existence9. 
The Pope refers in this case to the metaphysical truth and firmly believes in 
the possibility of arriving at it. Metaphysical truth would then condition the 
 9 D. Probucka, The Axiological Relativism and the Message of Pope John Paul II, op. cit. 
p. 233–235.
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existential truth, understood as a particular way of life based on the identity 
of thoughts, words and deeds. The Pope is convinced that the third kind of 
truth – the cognitive (epistemological) truth, understood as a feature of human 
judgement, is a component of existential truth10.
The metaphysical truth is the manifestation of the nature of the world, the 
‚unveiling‘ of being and understanding it as it is. The Pope assumes that the world 
may reveal its nature to man. This belief is characteristic of the representatives of 
the old philosophical mainstream derived from Parmenides, which can be found 
in the beliefs of Plato, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and in modern 
times, developed by the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger. It is following the three above ‑mentioned dimensions of truth 
and inciting others to such a life that is called by the Pope the ‚diaconate of truth‘. 
It is based on man deciding to serve the truth, and confirming this ministry by his 
words and deeds11. This is the essence of the Christian life. St. John Paul II refers 
in this case to the rules which applied in the early Christian communities. After 
all, the condition of belonging to the community was a public rejection of the 
motto diaboli, i.e. renunciation of lies and slander. A Christian was a person who 
spoke the truth, who has not spoken falsely for himself and others. A Christian 
was a person who decided to serve the truth, even at the cost of death.
This ‚ministry of truth‘ was based on the realisation of the inherent man‘s 
need to know oneself, the world and God. It was based on asking questions 
about the meaning of one‘s own existence and that of the world. It should also be 
emphasised that the very effort to reach the truth resulted in the humanisation 
of those who undertook it. Hence the moral postulate: ‚strive for the truth‘ was 
at the same time the principle, according to which our humanity should develop. 
Thus, ‚seek the truth‘ would be the same as the directive ‚become a human‘, or 
‚make your life more human‘. After all, a human is only the one who knows 
who he is, who knows himself. These words can be considered as representative 
for the entire philosophical and theological heritage of St. John Paul II, based 
on the postulate of searching for the ultimate truth, as well as on realisation of 
the existential truth, based on the identity of thoughts, words and deeds. For 
existential truth means a lack of contradiction between a thought and a spoken 
 10 J. F. Morris, ‘Fides et Ratio’ and John Paul’s Call to Catholic Philosophers: Orthodoxy and/
or the Unity of Truth, in: J. P. Hittinger, The Vocation of the Catholic Philosopher: From Maritain 
to John Paul II, Washington 2010, p. 196.
 11 John Paul II, The Encyclical Fides et Ratio, Poznań 1998, Pallotinum, p. 135.
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opinion, as well as compliance of actions with declarations. The man who is ‚in 
truth‘ is characterized by the fact that his words are a confirmation of his internal 
beliefs, and actions do not negate the previously expressed views.
St. John Paul II connects the idea of  being in truth with the Christian ethos 
of life, and opposes it to the civilization based on axiological relativism. In his 
opinion, such a civilization does not have in itself a sufficient capacity to survive 
and is doomed to slow decay. In his encyclical Fides et Ratio, the Pope remembers 
a scene in the Gospel, in which Christ, standing before Pilate, says: ‚He who is 
of the truth will follow me‘. And Pontius Pilate answers with a question: ‚And 
what is this truth‘? Pontius Pilate is a symbol of a civilization that has lost its 
axiological basis and is therefore doomed to hypocrisy understood as a way of 
life. Let us also add that the hypocrite is not only the one who lies, but the one 
who has lost the very ability to distinguish a lie from truth. Hypocrisy would be 
a kind of social disease, which does not attack human bodies, but destroys the 
spiritual dimension of culture, negating the objective nature of rules and values.
In the encyclical Fides et Ratio, the Pope indicates two ways to reach the truth, 
which according to him cannot be separated. This is because they are like two 
wings on which the human spirit can rise to the contemplate the truth. These are 
faith (Lat. fides) and reason (Lat. ratio). Hence the need for dialogue between the 
people of deep faith and the people of rational reflection, as postulated by 
the Pope. In his opinion, faith is needed in the process of cognition, however, its 
role should not be to weaken the rigour of thought and to deprive the reason of 
autonomy. Faith is there to remind people about the transcendental dimension 
of their existence. Therefore, faith should not limit intellect, but give the cognitive 
results a deeper, metaphysical sense12. In this case, the Pope refers to the ancient 
Greek word piscis, associating faith with confidence. Thus, to believe is to trust in 
the cognitive abilities of man, who looks for answers to ultimate questions and 
wants to reach the absolute truth. On the other hand, the Pope associates reason 
with the ancient Greek concept of logos orthos, based on nurturing such thinking, 
which should not only be correct in the logical sense, but also fair and right. Thus, 
the idea of orthos logos cannot be implemented by an heuristic, who wants to 
persuade others to their own theses at all cost, and to demonstrate that truth is 
his. Wojtyła‘s reason is bona mens – ‚the good mind‘. During one of his visits to 
Krakow, the Pope recalled the words written on a wall of the house of a medieval 
chronicler, Jan Dlugosz: ‚There is nothing better than a good mind‘. Therefore, 
 12 John Paul II, The Encyclical Fides et Ratio, Poznań 1998, Pallotinum, p. 42.
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bona mens means the kind of thinking that serves more than individual interests 
and particular goals, one which avoids manipulation and cannot be intimidated. 
It is the mind that implements the ‚ministry,‘ which is the pursuit of truth. The 
Pope directs this message to each of us, not just to philosophers, theologians 
or scientists. Therefore, let us cultivate in ourselves a ‚good mind,‘ or such 
a cognitive power, by means of which we will not manipulate other people and 
will not agree to being manipulated. This is the mind, which does not want to 
rule anyone, but it also does not agree to be bound by other people, if the price 
for it would be the abandonment of truth.
Worth emphasizing is also Wojtyła‘s postulate of joint thinking and a friendly 
discussion understood as mutual, friendly criticism focused on solving problems, 
and not just as a demonstration of the validity of one’s position. For when we 
live and think in isolation, without friends, our reason can become the most 
important and the only reason. According to the Pope, it is the contemporary 
cult of individualism that has contributed to the loss of faith in metaphysical 
truth. Only in dialogue, in interpersonal relations should the ultimate issues 
be discussed.
Finally, a few words about Wojtyła‘s concept of person, because what unites 
the above themes is the idea of  man as a free and rational entity, a being capable 
of doing good and learning the truth. Man is free in the sense that he can decide 
for himself. However, the activity of his will lies in the fact that he might not 
want to do what someone else expects of him. To recognise the human right 
to self ‑determination is thus to condemn the attempts to interfere in his will, to 
condemn putting pressure or instrumental treatment. Wojtyła included this 
postulate in a standard, which he described as ‚personalist‘. This is what it 
says: ‚A person cannot be treated as a subject, and in this form, as a means to 
an end‘13. And is not a lie one of the ways of using another person, or entire 
societies, in order to pursue one‘s own, or group interests? Thus, an individual 
or social consent to a lie and the lack of moral condemnation, which should 
include refusing to abide with a liar, means a consent to reify a human, to devalue 
humanity to what is consumable and useful. Therefore, passivity in the face of 
liars implies indifference to what happens to each of us and to what happens 
to our culture14.
 13 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, Lublin 1964, KUL, p. 31.
 14 John Paul II, The Encyclical Fides et Ratio, p. 72–73.
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